Addressing Vulnerabilities and Emergency Power Capacities in the Wastewater Sector of Massachusetts by Kader, Faria et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) Interactive Qualifying Projects
October 2018
Addressing Vulnerabilities and Emergency Power
Capacities in the Wastewater Sector of
Massachusetts
Faria Kader
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Marylouise Katherine Ross
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Michael Jon Kirejczyk
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Interactive Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Kader, F., Ross, M. K., & Kirejczyk, M. J. (2018). Addressing Vulnerabilities and Emergency Power Capacities in the Wastewater Sector of
Massachusetts. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all/5129
i 
 
 Addressing Vulnerabilities and 
Emergency Power Capacities in the 
Wastewater Sector of Massachusetts 
 
Faria Kader | ME | 20’ 
Michael Kirejczyk | BME | 20’ 
MaryLouise Ross | BME | 20’ 
 
Sponsor: Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
IQP Report - Fall 2018 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Addressing Vulnerabilities and Emergency Power 
Capacities in the Wastewater Sector of Massachusetts 
 
An Interactive Qualifying Project Report Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Degree of Bachelor of Science by:  
 
Faria Kader | ME | 20’ 
Michael Kirejczyk | BME | 20’ 
MaryLouise Ross | BME | 20’ 
 
Project Advisor: Seth Tuler  
Sponsor: Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
 
 
 
Fall 2018 
 
This report represents work of WPI undergraduate students submitted to the faculty as evidence of a degree 
requirement. WPI routinely publishes these reports on its web site without editorial or peer review. For more 
information about the projects program at WPI, see http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Projects 
 
 
ii 
 
Table of Contents 
Authorship.................................................................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract: ....................................................................................................................................................... vi 
Executive summary: .................................................................................................................................... vii 
1.0 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................1 
2.0 The critical role of Wastewater Infrastructure .........................................................................................2 
2.0.1 Effects of power outages ...............................................................................................................3 
2.1 Risk and Vulnerability .........................................................................................................................3 
2.1.1 Emergency Power .........................................................................................................................4 
2.2 MassDEP’s Current Emergency Initiative ...........................................................................................6 
3.0 Methodology: ...........................................................................................................................................7 
Objective 1: Characterize wastewater facilities’ emergency power capabilities and emergency 
resource knowledge ...............................................................................................................................7 
Objective 2: Determine facility vulnerability and risks associated with power loss .............................8 
Objective 3: Create informational tools to improve emergency preparedness in wastewater facilities 9 
4.0 Findings and discussion .........................................................................................................................10 
4.1 Findings related to data quality ..........................................................................................................10 
4.1.1. Data sets available to DEP are incomplete ................................................................................11 
4.1.2 Data on emergency backup power helps determine vulnerability, however incomplete data 
hinders vulnerability assessments ........................................................................................................13 
4.2 Findings related to future initiatives for emergency power ...............................................................14 
4.2.1 Massachusetts is progressing from the use of diesel generators to cleaner energy options .......14 
4.3 What DRDs and Section Chiefs want to know about emergency planning ......................................15 
4.3.1 Creating a map works as a visual representation of risks and vulnerabilities of wastewater sites 
around Massachusetts ..........................................................................................................................15 
4.3.2 Lack of funding impedes emergency preparation .......................................................................16 
4.3.3 Mutual aid enhances emergency response in wastewater facilities ............................................16 
5.0 Recommendations and Conclusions ......................................................................................................17 
5.1 MassDEP should implement a system for more reliable and accurate data gathering ......................17 
5.1.1 Require information reporting to MassDEP through regulation .................................................17 
5.1.2 Gather complete information about facility capacities in case of an emergency .......................17 
5.1.3 Conduct vulnerability assessments of facilities to allow responding agencies ...........................18 
5.2 Recommendations for informational resources to support emergency planning ...............................19 
5.3 Recommendations for future projects ................................................................................................19 
5.3.1 MassDEP should test and encourage facility self-assessment of backup power systems’ 
capacities and needs .............................................................................................................................19 
5.3.2 MassDEP should conduct similar studies on the drinking water sector of Massachusetts. ........20 
5.4 MassDEP should create targeted funding for backup power to facilities ..........................................20 
Appendix: .....................................................................................................................................................24 
Appendix A: interview questions. ............................................................................................................24 
Appendix B: Princeton Case Study ..........................................................................................................24 
Appendix C: Timeline ..............................................................................................................................26 
Appendix D: “Spider web” Self-assessment tool ....................................................................................28 
Appendix E: EPA map key ......................................................................................................................29 
iii 
 
 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1: Prototype map                                x 
Figure 2: Wastewater treatment process                               3 
Figure 3: Pros and cons of on-site vs off-site generators                                                                              5 
Figure 4: System function vs time during a disaster                                                                             5 
Figure 5: Risk and vulnerability categories                                                                                           8 
Figure 6: Map prototype                  15 
 
List of Tables  
Table 1: Program names and description                  6 
Table 2: Vulnerability scoring rules and criteria                  9 
Table 3: Two questions from combined data set                 11 
Table 4: Survey categories                   12 
Table 5: Data on vulnerability categories                 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Authorship 
1.0 - Introduction 
 Primary Author: MaryLouiseise Ross, Primary Editor: Faria Kader, Mike Kirejczyk 
 1.1 - Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: MaryLouiseise Ross, Mike Kirejczyk 
  1.1.1 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria   
Kader 
 1.2 - Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Faria Kader 
  1.2.1 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Faria Kader, Mike  
Kirejczyk 
 1.3 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Faria Kader, Mike Kirejczyk 
2.0 - Methodology 
 2.1 - Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Faria Kader 
 2.2 - Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Mike Kirejczyk  
 2.3 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Faria Kader, Mike Kirejczyk 
 2.4 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria Kader 
3.0 - Findings 
 Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Mike Kirejczyk 
 3.1 - Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Mike Kirejczyk 
3.1.1 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria 
Kader 
3.1.2 - Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Faria 
Kader 
 3.2 - Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Faria Kader 
3.2.1 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria 
Kader 
 3.3 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria Kader 
3.3.1 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria 
Kader 
3.3.2 - Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Mike 
Kirejczyk 
3.3.3 - Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Faria 
Kader 
4.0 - Recommendations and Conclusion 
 Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: Marylouise Ross, Faria Kader 
 4.1 - Primary Author:  MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria Kader 
4.1.1 - Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, 
MaryLouise Ross 
4.1.2 - Primary Author: Mike Kirejczyk, Primary Editor: MaryLouise Ross, Faria 
Kader 
v 
 
4.1.3 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria 
Kader 
 4.2 - Primary Author:  Faria Kader, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, MaryLouise Ross 
4.2.1 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria 
Kader 
4.2.2 - Primary Author: Faria Kader, Primary Editor: Marylouise Ross, Mike 
Kirejczyk 
 4.3 - Primary Author: MaryLouise Ross, Primary Editor: Mike Kirejczyk, Faria Kader 
 
  
vi 
 
Abstract: 
In the United States, more frequent and intense storms have been threatening vital water 
infrastructure, including wastewater and drinking water systems. We worked with MassDEP to 
improve back-up power capabilities to respond to power outages in wastewater facilities. Using 
data from MassDEP and EPA, we assessed risks and vulnerabilities associated with power loss. 
We concluded that the lack of data inhibits the ability to assess vulnerability. In addition, we 
found that facility managers could benefit from an interactive digital map of back-up power 
capabilities at wastewater facilities and information about opportunities to obtain funding to 
support upgrades. We recommend the MassDEP take further action to increase data quality and 
improve informational resources for facilities.  
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Executive summary 
In the United States, more frequent and intense storms have been threatening vital water 
infrastructure, including wastewater and drinking water systems (“Adapting to Climate 
Change…”, 2016). These storms, and subsequent flooding, can cause power outages that disrupt 
the functioning of these systems. One example is from the Greater Lawrence Sanitary District 
located in North Andover, Massachusetts. In 2017, a storm disrupted the power for 13 hours, and 
as a result, 8 million gallons of partially treated sewage water was spilled into the Merrimack 
River. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) has been 
attempting to investigate and record emergency backup plans for drinking and wastewater 
treatment facilities. This, however, has proven difficult due to the lack of consistency in the 
currently available data. We collaborated with the MassDEP to focus on gathering a more 
complete dataset on backup power in wastewater treatment facilities and gained a better 
understanding of current emergency capabilities.   
 
The goal of this project was to assess backup power capacities and needs of 
wastewater facilities in Massachusetts, to develop informational resources for regulators 
and emergency planners. 
  
Objectives and Methodology  
We accomplished our goal by completing three objectives: 
1. Characterizing wastewater facilities’ emergency power capabilities and emergency 
resource knowledge 
2. Determining facility vulnerability and risks associated with power loss  
3. Create informational tools to improve emergency preparedness in wastewater facilities 
 
For objective 1, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a Deputy Regional 
Director (DRD) of the Bureau of Water Resources, and 3 wastewater Section Chiefs. We gained 
a better understanding of how water systems work, what sort of plans are being used already, and 
past instances of power loss. We also gathered feedback on what information is useful to 
managers, regional directors and sections chiefs to plan for emergencies. 
For objective 2, we assessed the risk of power outages, for which we considered risks of 
flooding which can contribute to power loss. We considered a facility’s ability to cope with a 
power outage as a function of vulnerability. This includes, how long a facility can run on backup 
power, whether emergency power can operate the full system or only part of it, generator age, 
maintenance of equipment, and ability to get needed supplies from neighboring systems. Using 
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the data from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) showing Federal Emergency 
Management Association (FEMA) flood zones and self-reported flood risks, we determined that 
sites with high self-reported flood risk would be at greatest risk of a power outage. Survey data, 
obtained by employees at the MassDEP, included information about facilities that have their own 
form of backup power, their emergency power capacities, and those who partake in mutual aid 
sharing of resources. When we assessed the vulnerabilities in wastewater facilities, we focused 
on the sites without adequate emergency power and those who are not involved in mutual aid 
agreements. 
 For our final objective, we developed the best way to present information. We developed 
a prototype map to highlight Massachusetts’ facility emergency power capabilities, flood zones, 
mutual aid participation, etc. The map can be used to identify which specific facilities are more 
vulnerable, allowing the MassDEP to target those facilities that could benefit from additional 
resource implementation. DEP staff suggested that information could be shared effectively with 
a pamphlet for the facility managers to increase awareness of resources available to them. We 
used multiple resources from EPA.gov, Mass.gov, and other outlets of information, to identify 
resources available to wastewater facilities regarding emergency preparation. The pamphlet 
contains explanations on WARN, grant aid options, and other ideas of backup power. 
 
Findings 
	 Our interviews and discussions with the MassDEP have helped us discover the 
reasonings behind the lack of efficient emergency backup power response within facilities.  
1. Data sets available to DEP are incomplete  
We have recognized the need to improve the quality of compiled data in the 
MassDEP database since some of the information on wastewater facilities is incomplete. 
The data set show that 66% of facilities in the database have not reported whether they 
have backup power, or if the backup power is adequate enough to operate the facility. We 
were not able to completely assess which facilities are considered vulnerable throughout 
the entirety of Massachusetts and were limited only to facilities on which MassDEP has 
reported data.  
2. Findings related to future initiatives for emergency power 
MassDEP is moving towards a green and sustainable energy initiative through the 
clean energy results program, which is why we looked into other forms of power that are 
more energy efficient. We have discovered some current options that include solar arrays 
and wind turbines to provide additional power, which proves more sustainable than diesel 
generators. These arrays and turbines can cut down electrical cost and usage for the 
facilities.  
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3. What DRDs and Section Chiefs want to know about emergency planning 
During our interviews, we asked the DRDs and Section Chiefs for feedback on 
what kind of information would be helpful to include in a digital map. As an example, we 
sent them the EPA map key that we referenced, which can be seen in Appendix E. 
Overall, they expressed that the EPA key was informative and easy to understand. As a 
result, we used the EPA map key as guidance for our deliverable. It was also found that a 
frequent concern that DRDs and Section Chiefs mentioned to us is a lack of funding for 
facilities to update or enhance their backup power capabilities. Another emergency 
response aid we decided to focus on WARN because it exclusively involves public 
systems, which is the main focus for MassDEP. Since WARN is a vital tool to increase 
cooperation between facilities, our sponsors emphasized the necessity of sharing 
information regarding the program with facility managers. This can be very useful to 
facility managers trying to recover from a power outage.  
 
Recommendations  
Based on our study we proposed five recommendations to the MassDEP. These 
recommendations are intended to help increase knowledge of vulnerable facilities in 
Massachusetts, and prompt actions to minimize their vulnerability.  
 
1. MassDEP should implement a system for more reliable and accurate data gathering 
 While analyzing and combining the data set, we concluded that the lack 
information can directly hinder effective emergency response plans. We recommend that 
reporting backup power capacity be made a requirement for every facility. It also would 
be useful to conduct another complete survey on emergency power because currently 
there are many gaps in the data on important information that could be useful to the 
MassDEP. Once the facilities are surveyed, it is recommended the MassDEP do a 
vulnerability assessment. This assessment can assist with comprehending the range of 
vulnerability from site to site. 
2.  MassDEP should improve on informational resources to support emergency 
planning  
 A future project we recommend is to complete the digital map resource so that it 
includes all wastewater facilities in the Commonwealth. Our map prototype is not 
completed, and currently shows three locations and the categories on vulnerabilities we 
wanted to highlight:  
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Figure 1: Prototype map 
 
We believe it would be a useful tool in assessing and prioritizing facilities’ vulnerabilities 
during an emergency or power outage. The map can be completed using the available 
survey data. 
3. The MassDEP should create a self-assessment tool for facility managers  
Future projects should create a self-assessment tool that can aid facility managers 
track a site’s information and gauge its vulnerability and identify areas or methods for 
improvement. We also found an apparent need for targeted funding to help wastewater 
facilities improve their backup power capabilities and reliability. We recommend that an 
increased focus on what grants are available to the facilities for backup power 
infrastructure should be prioritized. The pamphlet deliverable is one method of spreading 
information on the types of grants available, but it is recommended that other methods 
also be implemented.  
4. The MassDEP should create targeted funding for backup power through a website 
Based on our project analysis and assessment of the existing resources available, 
interviews with MassDEP’s DRDs, Section Chiefs and feedback from our sponsors, we 
see an apparent need for targeted funding to help wastewater facilities improve their 
backup power capabilities and reliability. The pamphlet deliverable is one method of 
spreading information on the types of grants available but it is recommended that other 
methods also be implemented. For example, by compiling grant or funding information 
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and application links into one webpage could make access easier for site managers. It 
could be organized by factors like facility size requirements, public vs private grants, 
grants for renewable energy, etc.  
5. The MassDEP should conduct similar vulnerability assessments on the drinking 
water facilities in Massachusetts 
While power outages in wastewater facilities are a large concern, it is also 
important to understand and address vulnerabilities in the drinking water facilities around 
Massachusetts. We recommend that the MassDEP do similar surveys and vulnerability 
assessments on drinking water facilities. 
  
Conclusion 
When power outages occur in wastewater treatment facilities, there can be very serious 
consequences. Any spills or leaks of untreated sewage water into the community can cause very 
serious health risks from parasites and harmful bacteria. This is why it is so vital to ensure that 
wastewater treatment facilities continue to operate even when the main electrical grid goes out. 
The MassDEP is taking the initiative to document the emergency power capabilities in the water 
sector of Massachusetts. Through this project we have concluded that the lack of data inhibits the 
MassDEP from understanding vulnerabilities and needs of municipal wastewater facilities. 
Further efforts need to be taken to improve data quality and increase focus on the needs of 
facilities. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 In the United States, more frequent and intense storms have been threatening vital water 
infrastructure, including wastewater and drinking water systems (“Adapting to Climate 
Change…”, 2016). For example, in August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused catastrophic 
damage to states along the Gulf coast. Record breaking flooding destroyed cities and wiped out 
vital municipal infrastructure. The hurricane led to a disruption in power of more than 200 
wastewater facilities (Copeland, 2005). Without power, treatment plants are no longer able to 
provide clean water to the communities around them, which can lead to more instances of 
disease and illness. Two weeks following the storm, only 40% of affected wastewater facilities 
were operational, and thus left millions without safe drinking water (Copeland, 2005). During 
hurricane Florence in 2018, there were generator failures at wastewater utilities (Wissbaum, 
2018). The failures led to partially-treated wastewater to be released into the environment 
(Wissbaum, 2018).   
Storms that are less severe than hurricanes can also profoundly impact water 
infrastructure. One example was in 2017, in the town of Lynn, Massachusetts, where heavy rain 
caused flash flooding that resulted in large amounts of property damage. Residents reported that 
sewage began overflowing in their sinks and toilets (Donnelly, 2018). One resident reported that 
the wastewater rose several feet in her basement, causing tens of thousands of dollars in damage 
(Donnelly, 2018). Older cities like Lynn have combined sewer systems that link storm water 
drainage and wastewater systems from homes or businesses (Donnelly, 2018). As a result, when 
flooding occurs, the water infrastructure cannot always cope with the influx of water.  
Over the past decade, the number of storm systems has increased due to climate change 
(Extreme Weather, 2015). More extreme events will increase the amount of outside water inflow 
into sanitary and combined sewers (“Climate Impacts on Water Facilities”, 2017). It would be 
ideal to move a facility to a better location or reconstruct certain facilities to be more adaptive to 
increased weather related instances. Unfortunately, this is not realistic due to the fact that 
reconstructing them could cost upwards of millions of dollars (Marshall, 2018). Thus, emergency 
planning is a critical strategy for protecting the water utilities in place (“Climate Impacts on 
Water Facilities”, 2017). Because power is vital, understanding and improving a facility’s 
emergency power plan can reduce the time the facility is inactive (“Increased Power 
Resilience…”, 2017).  
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) has been 
attempting to investigate and record emergency backup plans for drinking and wastewater 
treatment facilities. This, however, has proven difficult due to the lack of consistency in the 
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currently available data. We collaborated with the MassDEP to focus on gathering a more 
complete dataset on backup power in wastewater treatment facilities, and gained a better 
understanding of current emergency capabilities. One issue that has been brought up to us by our 
sponsors is the inconsistent documentation of facility backup power, which is acting as a barrier 
in helping utilities during power loss (Divris, 2018). The goal of this project was to assess 
backup power capacities and needs of wastewater facilities in Massachusetts, to develop 
informational resources for regulators and emergency planners. Data of vulnerabilities and risks 
within the facilities helped us create a concept of a map to have a visual representation of which 
facilities need the most help from response agencies. We have also developed a pamphlet to 
present important information on mutual aid and backup power options currently available to 
wastewater facilities. The map will assist the MassDEP in providing aid to the wastewater 
utilities that are deemed vulnerable, and the pamphlet will outline helpful resources available to 
facility managers. 
In the remainder of this report, we discuss a general overview of wastewater 
infrastructure, and the effects of power outages on them. Then, we define risks to facilities, 
vulnerabilities to long term outages, and introduce possible energy options for facilities to 
increase resiliency.  
 
2.0 The critical role of Wastewater Infrastructure 
There are around 16,000 wastewater treatment facilities around the United States and 
around 200 facilities in Massachusetts. Wastewater is water that been used in a home, business 
or industrial process. Harmful substances or chemical waste, such as pesticides, are sometimes 
disposed of in water systems, which is a threat to public water. There also can be other dangers 
such as animal waste or human attacks like bioterrorism that pose a threat in untreated water 
(“Drinking Water Distribution…”, 2017). Wastewater treatment plants are a vital component of 
municipalities because they ensure the removal of any harmful contaminants.   
In wastewater treatment systems, water goes through a primary treatment, which involves 
the screening and removal of any solids as shown in Figure 1 (Loftus, 2018). The secondary 
treatment steps, which are different based on each facility, involve aeration, chemical, and/or 
bacterial remediation, to remove any harmful contaminants (Loftus, 2018). Then, the water goes 
onto multiple testing stages that verify that the water has been purified to a level where it can be 
discharged into the environment and poses no threat to human health.  
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Figure 2: Wastewater Treatment Process1 
 
2.0.1 Effects of power outages  
 Water contamination is a significant concern during power outages. For example, San 
Diego, CA, experienced an unexpected 12 hour electrical outage in 2011 which caused sites to 
be unable to filter and clean incoming water. Wastewater treatment facilities began spilling 
millions of gallons of sewage into local rivers because of backup and overflows (Miles, 2014). 
Samples from the rivers indicated elevated fecal bacteria levels, and reduced dissolved oxygen in 
the water (Miles, 2014). Even when the power was restored 12 hours after the initial shut down, 
the environmental effects were recorded up to two weeks after the event occurred (Miles, 2014). 
Being exposed to untreated water can lead to infectious bacteria such as E. Coli and salmonella 
entering the body. Symptoms of these bacterial infections include diarrhea, vomiting, 
dehydration and stomach cramps, which require antibiotic treatment (“Water Treatment”, 2015). 
Another result of contaminated water is parasites such as Cryptosporidium, which is a small 
parasite that lives in the host's intestines (“Water Treatment”, 2015). To minimize serious health 
risks and environmental pollution, the power must be restored as quickly as possible.   
 
2.1 Risk and Vulnerability 
A better understanding of risk to power outage, and how well a facility can cope, can help 
reduce the amount of time a facility is inoperable. Increasing information and data sharing 
between facilities and response agencies not only helps target sites with high risk, it also helps to 
reduce the vulnerabilities to long term power outages. A risk is something that exposes someone 
or something valued to danger, harm, or loss (Risk, n.d.). In this context, we defined risk as the 
potential of a power outage. A facility with a high likelihood and severity of an outage, in 
                                                
1 Environmental Protection Agency. (September, 2011). Primer for Municipal Wastewater  
Treatment Systems. Retrieved from https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/primer.pdf  
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weather related events, is at a higher risk. After addressing the risk to sites, it is important to 
examine vulnerabilities of how a facility might mitigate an outage if it were to occur.  
Vulnerability is the “quality or state of being exposed to the possibility of being attacked 
or harmed” (Vulnerability, n.d.). A concern that wastewater facilities have is an extended power 
outage, which is considered to be any power loss that lasts longer than 4 hours (310 CMR 22.04, 
2016). A facility’s vulnerability to a long-term power outage is a function of its ability to cope 
with an electrical disruption. For example, if a facility has adequate emergency power to operate 
at full capacity, or how long a facility can run on emergency generators. Knowledge of these 
types of factors can help response agencies determine to what extent a wastewater site may be 
affected. If a particular site has higher likelihood of a power outage, or an outage of high 
severity, emergency preparations should be a top priority. Understanding how well the facility 
can mitigate the damage caused by an emergency after it has occurred can help determine if a 
facility can restore functionality on their own or if they need further assistance.  
 
2.1.1 Emergency Power 
 An important approach to reducing vulnerability is the availability of emergency power 
sources Backup power ensures that wastewater utilities are able to continue providing their 
services even when there are outages (“Increased Power Resiliency at Your…”, 2017). One 
option for emergency power is for the facility to run on its own microgrid. Microgrids allow 
facilities to isolate themselves from the main electrical grid either manually or automatically 
(“Microgrids...”, 2014). This independence allows that facility to continually run critical 
equipment, while surrounding grids may experience power outages in the event of extreme 
weather or maintenance (“Microgrids…”, 2014). One example of a microgrid being used was at 
Princeton University, where two microgrids were activated during Hurricane Sandy. Princeton 
was used as an emergency shelter for two days unaided by utility supplied power 
(“Microgrids…”, 2014). Microgrids allowed the facility to manage its critical electrical load 
until power on the macrogrid was restored and fully functional. 
  Currently, the most common backup power systems for wastewater utilities are 
generators. According to the EPA, when considering a proper generator system, the facility 
needs to determine equipment voltage, phase configuration, and other amperage needs (“Is Your 
System Prepared?”, 2011). Based on the amount of electrical needs, generator options include 
large stationary generators or smaller portable ones. Figure 2 shows the pros and cons of on-site 
versus off-site generators. 
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Figure 3: Pros and cons of on-site vs off-site generators2 
Having on-site electrical generators, as shown in figure 3, can have an immense impact 
on recovery time (Chang et al, 2013). In figure 3, initial time, ( 0), shows where a disaster 
strikes water utilities and infrastructure. The graph shows the influence of pre-disaster mitigation 
(i.e ex ante mitigation) compared to post disaster mitigation (i.e ex post action). For example, 
this shows how installing a generator in facilities can prevent a complete loss of function, 
compared to receiving a generator from an emergency response agency. When a storm hits, 
generators are able to turn on and stop the water facility from going non-operational. 
Figure 4: System function vs time during a disaster3 
 
                                                
2 Environmental Protection Agency. (2015). Power Resilience: Guide for Water and Wastewater  
Utilities. Retrieved March 27, 2018 from:  
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-03/documents/160212-powerresilienceguide508.pdf 
3 Chang, S. E., Mcdaniels, T., Fox, J., Dhariwal, R., & Longstaff, H. (2013). Toward  
Disaster-Resilient Cities: Characterizing Resilience of Infrastructure Systems with Expert  
Judgments. Risk Analysis, 34(3), 416-434. doi:10.1111/risa.12133 
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In addition to traditional generators that run off a fuel source like diesel or natural gas, 
solar energy is also an alternative on-site energy system. Photovoltaic (PV) solar energy is a 
solar panel that contains a semiconductor material which, when paired with an electric inverter, 
converts the sun’s solar radiation into electricity. According to preliminary research, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts receives enough solar energy- 4 kilowatt-hours per square 
meter per day (kWh/m2/day) - to justify the use of solar panels as a supplemental energy source 
(“Commonwealth of Massachusetts Renewable Energy…”, 2009). Solar panels can work in cold 
temperatures, and continually work when cleared of snow (“Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Renewable Energy…”, 2009). A case study done at the University of Massachusetts in Lowell, 
looked at the viability of a wind-photovoltaic (wind-PV) hybrid power system. This case study 
can be seen in appendix A.  
With multiple types of energy generation, facilities have many options when preparing 
for emergencies. In addition to electrical generation, working in conjunction with response 
agencies can decrease the time of power outage.  
 
2.2 MassDEP’s Current Emergency Initiative 
The MassDEP has multiple ongoing projects that assist in preparing wastewater utilities 
for emergency situations, which are highlighted in table 1. 
Program What it does  
Water Utility Resilience Program (WURP) WURP works to compile previously collected data on 
wastewater and drinking water facilities, and uses that 
information to assess how vulnerable that facility may 
be in a storm or man-made disaster. WURP then 
prioritizes assistance to the facilities with high 
vulnerability based on where the facilities are located 
and infrastructure data (Water Utility Resilience 
Program, n.d.). 
Water and Wastewater Agency Response 
Network (WARN) 
WARN bridges communication between facilities 
during emergencies. The focus of WARN is the Mutual 
Aid Assistance Network. This program is a “utilities 
helping utilities” approach to recovering from a natural 
or man-made disaster by sharing equipment and 
personnel (WasteWater systems, 2010).  
Table 1: Program names and description 
In addition to programs like WURP and WARN, the MassDEP regulates emergency 
power plans for these facilities. The Code of Massachusetts Regulations (CMR) defines what is 
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required in emergency plans. 314 CMR states that “All persons operating wastewater treatment 
facilities shall prepare, adopt, and keep current an operation and maintenance manual” (314 
CMR 12.00, 2014.). This manual must include emergency operating and response programs, 
safety, and utilities and energy requirements (314 CMR 12.00, 2014).   
 While the MassDEP has programs and regulations about emergency backup power, there 
is still a need for more preparation in regard to emergencies. While Emergency planning is 
important, the MassDEP and other response agencies face obstacles in planning for outages 
because they lack knowledge of facilities’ needs. There has been an effort to record emergency 
power capability data, but this information is incomplete. In the following chapter we outline the 
processes used to address these problems. 
3.0 Methodology 
The goal of this project was to assess backup power capacities and needs of municipal 
wastewater facilities in Massachusetts and to develop informational resources for regulators and 
emergency planners. We accomplished this goal by achieving the following objectives: 
1. Characterizing wastewater facilities’ emergency power capabilities and emergency 
resource knowledge 
2. Determining facility vulnerability and risks associated with power loss  
3. Create informational tools to improve emergency preparedness in wastewater facilities 
 
Objective 1: Characterize wastewater facilities’ emergency power capabilities and 
emergency resource knowledge 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with a Deputy Regional Director (DRD) of the 
Bureau of Water Resources, and 3 wastewater Section Chiefs. We ensured that all sensitive 
information was managed in excel sheets (or in pdf format) and given to MassDEP workers with 
correct security clearance in their secure data drive.  To guarantee the privacy and well-being of 
participants, all questions have undergone review by the International Review Board, and all 
precautions have been taken to protect the interviewees’ name and identities. All interviews were 
voluntary and could be stopped at any time. We gained a better understanding of how water 
systems work, what sort of plans are being used already, and past instances of power loss. We 
also gathered feedback on what information is useful to managers, regional directors and sections 
chiefs during emergencies. Once we gathered all of the interview responses, we compared and 
contrasted the responses to each question. The interview questions used can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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When working towards this objective, we considered some practicalities that inhibited 
our data collection. We were unable to interview some DRDs and Section Chiefs due to time 
constraints. Originally, we had interviewed both drinking water and wastewater DRDs/section 
chiefs, but our focused changed to wastewater so we were unable to use information from the 
drinking water sector as evidence. 
 
 Objective 2: Determine facility vulnerability and risks associated with power loss  
To assess risk of power outages, we considered risks of flooding which can contribute to power 
loss. Then, to assess vulnerability we considered several factors, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 5: Risk and vulnerability categories 
A map from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shows Federal Emergency 
Management Association (FEMA) flood zones and self-reported flood risks. Using the data from 
the EPA map, we determined that sites with high self-reported flood risk would be at greatest 
risk of a power outage. Survey data, taken by employees at the MassDEP, included facilities that 
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have their own form of backup power, emergency power capacities, and those who partake in 
mutual aid sharing of resources. When we assessed the vulnerabilities in wastewater facilities, 
we focused on the sites without adequate emergency power and those who are not involved in 
mutual aid agreements. To assess these vulnerabilities, we created a point system to give each 
facility a “vulnerability score”. The questions and point system can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Are you in 
mutual aid?  
How much of 
your facility 
can be run on 
backup 
power: (All, 
Partial, None) 
How 
frequently is 
your backup 
system 
tested? 
(Weekly, 
Monthly, 
Quarterly) 
How long can 
your facility 
run on 
backup 
power? 
What is the 
age of 
generators in 
years?  
Vulnerability 
score 
Yes= 0 
No= 1 
All= 0 
Partial= 1 
Weekly= 0 
Monthly= .5 
Quarterly= 1 
0-5 days= 1 
5+ days= 0 
0-30 years= 0 
30+ years= 1 
Column 1 + 
column 2+ 
…. = vuln. 
score 
Table 2: Vulnerability scoring rules and criteria  
 A restriction that we encountered in the information available to us was that the data had 
not been updated for the facilities in some of the sources. Also, not every facility was represented 
in our dataset because facilities are not required to report all their information to the MassDEP. 
 
Objective 3: Create informational tools to improve emergency preparedness in wastewater 
facilities 
 Emergency planners require accurate and complete information in order to deliver proper 
emergency response. For this objective, we developed the best way to present information. We 
intended to use GIS in order to create a map of Massachusetts that highlights facilities’ 
emergency power capabilities, flood zones, mutual aid participation, etc. Displaying the 
compiled vulnerability data through the GIS program would make future research and analyses 
easier in case of emergencies because most vulnerable sites can be identified visually. During 
our interviews in objective 1 with the DEP employees and DRDs, we inquired on what they 
would like to see on the map. The GIS map can take an extended period of time to complete. We 
set up a meeting with a GIS specialist at the MassDEP to determine what can be shown on the 
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map visually. After meeting with him, it became evident that we did not have enough time for 
the creation of it, which has only allowed us to develop a prototype/mockup of the map.   
The map developed can be used to identify which specific facilities are more vulnerable, 
allowing the MassDEP to target those facilities that could benefit from additional resource 
implementation. DEP staff suggested that information could be shared effectively with a 
pamphlet for the facility managers to increase awareness of resources available to them. We used 
multiple resources from EPA.gov, Mass.gov, and other outlets of information, to identify 
resources available to wastewater facilities regarding emergency preparation. The pamphlet 
contains explanations on WARN, grant aid options, and other ideas of backup power. The 
pamphlet can be seen in Appendix C. In order to prioritize what information to include on the 
pamphlet, we corroborated with our sponsors to narrow down what programs could be most 
useful to site managers, and the best layout to organize information efficiently.  
After, we presented our findings to the MassDEP, to broaden their options for technical 
assistance to drinking water and wastewater facilities and recommend our implementations to 
help improve emergency response for facilities. Through our objectives, the potential impact of 
the project will allow the MassDEP to further assist drinking water and wastewater facilities 
throughout Massachusetts.  
4.0 Findings and discussion	
 This chapter highlights our findings for this project and the interpretations of those 
findings. Our interviews and discussions with the MassDEP have helped us discover the 
reasonings behind the lack of efficient emergency backup power response within facilities. We 
have recognized the need to improve the quality of compiled data in the MassDEP database since 
some of the information on wastewater facilities is incomplete. Our study also helped to identify 
vulnerabilities and needs for more assistance regarding mutual aid or grants.  
 
4.1 Findings related to data quality  
Qualitative data is essential in understanding the needs or risks to facilities responding to 
power outages. Our project description mentioned that sharing of data was a concern to the DEP 
(Divris, 2017). Our analysis suggests that a poor data quality presents significant challenges that 
hinder understanding the status of facility’s emergency power efficiency or needs. 
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4.1.1. Data sets available to DEP are incomplete  
In 2012, the EPA did a survey on emergency power in wastewater facilities. Another 
survey was taken in 2017, by Kristin Divris and John Murphy of the MassDEP. There are around 
120 public wastewater treatment sites in Massachusetts, and with both surveys combined, we 
have data on about 169, implying that some privately-owned facilities were also surveyed. 56 
responses were recorded for the MassDEP survey and 108 from the EPA survey. Since many 
facilities were not accounted for in the survey data, there is a lack of completeness in the data set. 
Also, some facilities only filled out one survey, or only had data that satisfies half of the 
columns.  
Table 3 illustrates the lack of data by showing responses and non-responses to two 
questions in the surveys. These examples show that 66% of facilities in the database have not 
reported whether they have backup power, or if the backup power is adequate enough to operate 
the facility. Questions like these are a crucial part of determining how vulnerable a facility is and 
can affect the efficiency of emergency response.  
Does the facility have emergency backup 
power?  
Yes: 56/169 
No: N/A 
No Information: 113/169 
Does the facility have adequate backup power 
to run the facility during an outage? 
Yes: 51/169 
No: 5/169  
No Information: 113/169 
Table 3: Two questions from combined data set 
Another problem was caused by differing categories between surveys, illustrated in table 
4, which made combining results into one spreadsheet difficult. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
EPA survey  MassDEP survey 
Flood Risk Does your facility have an emergency backup 
power system? (Yes/no) 
Generator at critical locations in plant  How much of the facility can be run on the 
backup system? (All, partial, none) 
Generator in collection system Does the backup system come on 
automatically or is there a switch to turn it on? 
(Automatic/switch) 
Pump stations operate under SCADA Is the backup system adequate for facility 
needs? (Yes/no) 
Generator for pump station Would you be interested in acquiring a 
backup power system, or upgrading your 
existing system? (Acquire, update existing, 
neither) 
% of plant that can operate on backup power 
(All, partial or none) 
How frequently is the back-up system tested? 
(Weekly, monthly, quarterly) 
How long they can operate on generator 
without refueling 
Is the backup system tested under full load? 
(Yes/no) 
Inundate or damage What type of fuel is used for the generators? 
(Diesel, gasoline, liquid propane, natural gas) 
Inundate or damage items How many hours of fuel capacity are onsite to 
run the emergency backup system? 
Inaccessible during flood What are the age of your generators in years? 
Cause of flooding Are the generators fixed, portable, or towable 
units?  
Money spent Is the location of any fixed generators in the 
100 year floodplain, or subject to any 
flooding? (Yes/no or unknown) 
 
Table 4: Survey Categories. The categories marked in green were combined in final spreadsheet 
 
 In order to preserve relevant emergency power knowledge, we decided to combine the 
entirety of the data gathered from each survey into one data set. As a result, the spreadsheet has 
all the data categories from both surveys, and any that were similar were combined into one 
column (these are shown in Table 4 in green text). Another concern is that the data from the EPA 
13 
 
survey is outdated because it was given back in 2012. In an interview with a Section Chief, the 
pointed out that one facility on the map was no longer active. Since lack of response lowers the 
quality of data that the MassDEP has gathered, there is an increased importance of consistent 
response rate from the facility managers.  
4.1.2 Data on emergency backup power helps determine vulnerability, however incomplete data 
hinders vulnerability assessments 
A facilities’ ability to cope with a power outage, or how well a facility’s emergency 
power restores operation, determines vulnerability. The data set that the MassDEP provided 
helped us categorize and rank the facilities vulnerabilities. Using this information, we found the 
following. 
Categories from combined spreadsheet Number of facilities / Total number of 
facilities 
Facility’s Self Reported Flood Risk  High: 15/169 
Medium: 37/169 
Low: 58/169 
No Information: 59/169 
Is the facility a part of mutual aid? Yes: 98/169 
No: 56/169 
No Information: 15/169 
How often does your generator get tested? 
How long can the facility run off emergency 
backup power? 
Weekly: 23/169 
Monthly: 23/169 
Quarterly: 1/169 
Annually: 2/169 
No Information: 120/169 
What is the age of your generator? 0-30 years old: 36/169 
31+ years old: 19/169 
No Information: 114/169 
How long can the facility run off emergency 
backup power? 
0-5 Days: 66/169 
6-10 Days: 12/169 
11+ days: 15/169 
No Information: 76/169 
   
Table 5: Data on vulnerability categories   
We originally designed a vulnerability point system between all the categories of data 
and ranked the facilities based on that system. Due to the missing information, we could not 
determine whether that facility had a vulnerability within those categories. We were not able to 
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completely assess which facilities are considered vulnerable throughout the entirety of 
Massachusetts and were limited only to facilities on which MassDEP has reported data. No 
accurate or complete vulnerability ranking can be created without significant additional data 
collection by agencies such as MassDEP. The ability to gather complete information will be a 
challenge. John Murphy and Kristin Divris commented that the 2017 survey they conducted was 
time consuming and took months to complete, leading us to believe that completing the list of 
facilities also would take a significant amount of time. 
 
4.2 Findings related to future initiatives for emergency power  
With increasing frequency of weather systems, proactive approaches to outage mitigation 
and prevention are critical. Understanding facilities’ needs and ways they can improve energy 
efficiency is vital to planning for future projects. The following sections identify what we 
learned about different types of energy options being used.  
4.2.1 Massachusetts is progressing from the use of diesel generators to cleaner energy options	
 According to our interviewees the most common type of backup power is in the form of 
diesel generators. Out of the 169 facilities we have data on, 56 documented what type of fuel 
they run on. Of 56 facilities recorded to have backup power, 51 are using diesel generators, as 
opposed to natural gas, gasoline, or liquid propane. Facilities relying on diesel depend on fuel 
deliveries, which increases vulnerability during long power outages. The occurrence of a large 
scale weather event could cause roads to be blocked by trees or ice, possibly affecting fuel 
delivery. If fuel cannot be delivered to a station, the facility may spend more time in an 
inoperable state. Another concern in regard to diesel use is that fuel that sits for too long in the 
tank becomes unusable, creating problems if an emergency need for that generator arises. 
Since MassDEP is moving towards a green and sustainable energy initiative through the 
clean energy results program, we looked into other forms of power that are more energy 
efficient. Some current options include solar arrays and wind turbines to provide additional 
power, which proves more sustainable than diesel generators. These arrays and turbines can cut 
down electrical cost and usage for the facilities. For example, the Massachusetts Water 
Resources Authority (MWRA) uses solar arrays, wind turbines, and methane fueled combustion 
generators. This allows that site to run autonomously using their own clean energy. The Greater 
Lawrence Sanitary District (GLSD) wastewater facility is also making the switch to energy 
efficient generation. GLSD is switching to a combined heat and power system that will allow 
them to be on their own grid and be self-sufficient. Operating on their own power grid means 
that they will be able to continue functioning, even if electricity on the main grid has been lost.  
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4.3 What DRDs and Section Chiefs want to know about emergency planning 
 To increase the accuracy of emergency planning, the DRDs and Section Chiefs have 
expressed the necessity of knowing facilities’ power abilities and possible needs. The following 
section relays feedback on what they and facility managers could find useful in an emergency 
situation. We also discuss facility needs to improve existing infrastructure through funding.  
4.3.1 Creating a map works as a visual representation of risks and vulnerabilities of wastewater 
sites around Massachusetts 
We used the combined data set to develop a graphic for a map which is specified in 
objective 3. Since there are facilities that did not respond or there is limited data on them, it 
affects the overall integrity of the map. During our interviews, we asked the DRDs and Section 
Chiefs for feedback on what kind of information would be helpful to include in a digital map. As 
an example, we sent them the EPA map key that we referenced, which can be seen in Appendix 
D. Overall, they expressed that the EPA key was informative and easy to understand. As a result, 
we used the EPA map key as guidance for our deliverable. The responses were as followed: 
- Knowing how much of a facility can run on backup power should be represented 
in the map.  
- What fuel a facility uses for generators, a “hot button” to show more data on each 
facility would also be very helpful, liked the key on the EPA map.  
- Liked the EPA map setup.  
We took all the feedback into consideration and developed a map prototype that can be seen in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Map Protoype 
4.3.2 Lack of funding impedes emergency preparation  
A focus in this project was to figure out challenges that hinder wastewater facilities’ 
response plan for power loss. A frequent concern that DRDs and Section Chiefs mentioned to us 
is a lack of funding for facilities to update or enhance their backup power capabilities. Most of 
the facilities that exist were also constructed in the 1980’s, during which 75% of construction 
costs were covered by the federal government and an additional 15% by the government of 
Massachusetts (Brander, 2018).  Grants such as the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
provide funds to prepare utilities for natural hazards (“Hazard Mitigation Program”, n.d). The 
grant amount from FEMA varies from $9,000 to $25,000 per community (“Hazard Mitigation 
Program”, n.d). These grants do not guarantee enough monetary assistance to enhance 
emergency backup power. Funding opportunities are also competitive and require a lot of effort 
to apply for.   
 
4.3.3 Mutual aid enhances emergency response in wastewater facilities   
Over 50% of the facilities completing the surveys reported that they were part of mutual 
aid agreements, which can be seen in figure 8. One type of mutual aid we wanted to feature was 
WARN. We decided to focus on WARN because it exclusively involves public systems, which is 
the main focus for MassDEP. Since WARN is a vital tool to increase cooperation between 
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facilities, our sponsors emphasized the necessity of sharing information regarding the program 
with facility managers.  
5.0 Recommendations and Conclusions 
 The work we have completed has led us to conclusions and recommendations for the 
MassDEP. These suggestions are intended to help increase knowledge of vulnerable facilities in 
Massachusetts, and prompt actions to minimize their vulnerability. In this section, we draw 
conclusions from our findings and make recommendations about data collection, vulnerability 
assessments, visual representations of data and making funding more accessible to facilities who 
need it.  
 
5.1 MassDEP should implement a system for more reliable and accurate data gathering 
While analyzing and combining the data set, we concluded that the lack information can 
directly hinder effective emergency response plans. With storm events occuring more often, the 
threat of complications in the water sector is becoming a concerning reality. We suggest that the 
MassDEP increase their available data on wastewater emergency backup power. There are 
several contributing factors that we have identified and recommended changes to increase readily 
available data. 
5.1.1 Require information reporting to MassDEP through regulation 
Currently, 314 CMR “Operation, Maintenance and Pretreatment Standards for 
Wastewater Treatment Works and Indirect Dischargers” states that all wastewater facilities are 
required to have some form of emergency backup power (314 CMR 12.00, 2014). However, they 
are not required to report the extent of their emergency backup power to MassDEP. The lack of 
responses to previous voluntary surveys contributes to the shortage of data in the DEP database, 
which obstructed our assessment of the data. We recommend that reporting backup power 
capacity be made a requirement for every facility. How often it needs to be reported, should be 
determined through conversations with wastewater managers and the MassDEP. Not only will 
reporting regulations increase facility response rate, it will ensure uniformity of responses in 
each category, and allow facilities to compare their “readiness” to other facilities.  
 
5.1.2 Gather complete information about facility capacities in case of an emergency 
 We recommend conducting another complete survey on emergency power because 
currently there are many gaps in the data on important information that could be useful to the 
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MassDEP. With missing information, the MassDEP is unable to understand all of the facilities’ 
needs when it comes to backup power.  When resending the survey to facilities, we recommend 
that survey questions on backup power be prioritized. This suggested improved survey should 
include questions such as: how long can your facility run on backup power, what type of backup 
power do you use, and what fuel source do you use? However, questions having “yes or no” 
responses will gather a baseline of facility information. Example questions that can be changed 
include:  
● Does the backup system come on automatically?  
○ Original: Does the backup system come on automatically or is there a switch?  
● Do you test your backup system?   
○ Original: How frequently is the backup system tested?  
 As facilities respond to the new surveys, the MassDEP should then add their responses 
straight into the spreadsheet we created or a similar spreadsheet to ours. This assures that the 
MassDEP has current and up to date data in a singular source. We recommend that this data 
spreadsheet be available to be viewed by the MassDEP staff and facility managers with secure 
login access. Security issues should be resolved before deciding on access to facility managers 
and to the public.  
 
5.1.3 Conduct vulnerability assessments of facilities to allow responding agencies to prioritize 
help  
 Understanding strengths and limitations of a wastewater system and location can allow 
the MassDEP and other responders to prioritize facilities that may need additional help in the 
event of an outage. We recommend the MassDEP do a vulnerability assessment, on facilities, 
using a similar point system described in the methodology chapter. This assessment can assist 
with comprehending the range of vulnerability from site to site. If a facility has a low 
vulnerability score, it does not have to be a top priority if an outage occurs. The point system can 
ensure a consistent evaluation of the necessary data.   
While doing this, a set criterion for what makes a facility vulnerable to long term power 
outages needs to be established. For example, we categorized the age of a generator as a 
vulnerability. However, whether or not age affects the generators ability to run adequately is 
situational. This led us to conclude that data categories, that can be generalized for every facility, 
would be most useful in a vulnerability assessment. 
 We also recommend setting a vulnerability timeframe for how long a facility can run on 
backup power.  A facility that can run on backup power for a longer time compared to other 
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facilities is less vulnerable. To be precise, there needs to be a distinction on how long a facility 
can run on backup power before it becomes categorized as vulnerable.   
 
5.2 Recommendations for informational resources to support emergency planning 
 An initiative we recommend is to complete the digital map resource so that it includes all 
wastewater facilities in the Commonwealth using the prototype. The map prototype that we have 
designed contains information such as flood risk, mutual aid options, whether or not the facility 
has backup power and for how long. Due to time constraints, we were unable to complete the 
map. However, it would be a useful tool in assessing and prioritizing facilities’ vulnerabilities. 
Like the data set, the map should be accessible to both the MassDEP and facility managers to 
utilize for emergency response. Security issues will need to be considered and decided before 
general access is provided.  
 
5.3 Recommendations for future projects 
 This project has given us important insight on wastewater facilities and the need to 
continue the research. Below we identify steps that can be taken in the future regarding improved 
emergency backup power knowledge in water infrastructure.  
5.3.1 MassDEP should test and encourage facility self-assessment of backup power systems’ 
capacities and needs 
 While we believe it is important for facilities to report their emergency backup power, it 
would also be beneficial to facility managers to have a general overview of their emergency 
power capacities in a visual diagram. We recommend creating a self-assessment tool for facilities 
to use. The self-assessment tool can aid facility managers with tracking a site’s information, 
gauging its vulnerability and identifying areas or methods for improvement. A type of self-
assessment tool that can encourage facilities to track their information, is the use of a “spider 
web” diagram that can be seen in Appendix E. One idea we recommend is to send this self-
assessment out to facilities every year, so they can see what has improved, changed, or stayed the 
same from year to year. It could also be made available at conferences and events. This 
assessment should include quick and general questions to encourage facility managers to fill it 
out, and can get facility managers interested in updating or improving their backup power 
capabilities. This assessment should be voluntary to facility managers; however we believe an 
assessment like this would make reporting to the MassDEP easier because the facility would 
have information about their emergency power capacities readily available. We also recommend 
that for future projects, quantitative questions need to be created so that reasonable insight to 
facilities can be provided.    
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5.3.2 MassDEP should conduct similar studies on the drinking water sector of Massachusetts.  
 While power outages in wastewater facilities are a large concern, it is also important to 
understand and address vulnerabilities in the drinking water facilities around Massachusetts. We 
recommend that the MassDEP do similar surveys and vulnerability assessments on drinking 
water facilities. This will allow the MassDEP to better understand facility needs and increase 
emergency response to these facilities in the event of an emergency.  
 
5.4 MassDEP should create targeted funding for backup power to facilities  
Based on our project analysis and assessment of the existing resources available, 
interviews with MassDEP’s DRDs, Section Chiefs and feedback from our sponsors, we see an 
apparent need for targeted funding to help wastewater facilities improve their backup power 
capabilities and reliability. These treatment facilities are critical public assets that are often 
overlooked when they are operating 24/7 behind the scenes, but quickly can become a public 
health and environmental threat during a prolonged power outage.  We recommend that an 
increased focus on what grants are available to the facilities for backup power infrastructure 
should be prioritized. The pamphlet deliverable is one method of spreading information on the 
types of grants available but it is recommended that other methods also be implemented. For 
example, compiling grant or funding information and application links into one webpage could 
make access easier for site managers. It could be organized by factors like facility size 
requirements, public vs private grants, grants for renewable energy, etc.  
 
Conclusion: 
When power outages occur in wastewater treatment facilities, there can be very serious 
consequences. Any spills or leaks of untreated sewage water into the community can cause very 
serious health risks from parasites and harmful bacteria. This is why it is so vital to ensure that 
wastewater treatment facilities continue to operate even when the main electrical grid goes out. 
In response to this, the MassDEP is taking the initiative to document the emergency power 
capabilities in the water sector of Massachusetts. 
During our project we combined emergency power survey data and conducted interviews, 
to help address vulnerabilities and emergency power capacities in the wastewater sector of 
Massachusetts. This led us do create a map prototype that visually represents facilities’ 
vulnerabilities, and an informational resource pamphlet for facility managers. These tools can be 
used by response agencies and the facility managers to increase emergency preparation efforts in 
wastewater treatment plants. What we found throughout our research is that the data sets at the 
DEP are incomplete, Massachusetts is moving toward cleaner energy options, and what specific 
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information Deputy Regional Directors would like to know in the event of an emergency power 
outage.  
Through this project we have concluded that the lack of data inhibits the MassDEP from 
understanding vulnerabilities and needs of municipal wastewater facilities. Further efforts need 
to be taken to improve data quality and increase focus on the needs of facilities 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Princeton Case Study 
In this study, data was collected over a two-year period and determined that the system 
satisfied its energy load requirements, with additional energy able to be stored in the batteries 
attached to the system (Giraud, 2001). It was found that energy gathered in a period of high-
energy activity -ample sun- could make up for a period of deficit (Giraud, 2001). However, 
periods during the winter months affected the amount of energy able to be converted and stored. 
This backup system only accounts for power outages for one to two days. Even though this may 
not be a viable option for facilities that are at highly vulnerable to long term power outage, wind-
PV is an option for facilities that may have less vulnerability and only experience short term 
power loss. 
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Appendix B: Interview questions  
Preamble: 
We are a group of students from Worcester Polytechnic Institute and we are working with the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection to gather information regarding emergency 
power in facilities. Currently, we are conducting interviews with regional directors regarding emergency 
power capacities. We are doing this to better understand what can be done to increase preparedness and 
information sharing. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may withdraw 
at any time. If you would like, we would be happy to include your comments as anonymous.  
 
1. To start off, can you tell us your title, where your work, and what you do there.  
2. What are some of the variations of the facilities in your region?  
a. For example do some use biological treatment? Chemical? Etc… 
3. Have any of the facilities in your region experienced any power outages that have lasted more 
than 4 hours at a time? (examples:winter storms, hurricane sandy/irene, nor'easter, non-weather 
related incidents?) 
a. Have any of those outages resulted in problems at the facility? For example, release of 
untreated wastewater, inability to supply adequate drinking water or to treat it?    
4. Have there been any facilities where power outages are becoming consistent?  
5. What are some of the basic protocols that your office follows in preparation of an emergency 
situation (i.e hurricane)? What about after an incident (weather or non-weather related) has 
occurred? 
a. What are some of the priority actions to take? What types of difficulties follow the 
priority actions?  
6. What are some types of backup power used in facilities? Which is most common? Why? 
a. Are there any facilities that run on other power sources such as a microgrid?  
7. When power outages occur, what components of the system are most likely to go down?  
a. What happens when a components of a system fails.  
b. In general, what part of the system would have backup power? The whole system? Only 
parts of the system?  
8.  What challenges have you or specific facilities faced concerning emergency backup power? 
a. Money? Regulations? Accessibility?  
We are creating a pamphlet that outlines information on emergency power options and also mutual aid 
programs such as WARN. Part of this project is understanding how to help facilities gain information to 
better prepare themselves incase of an emergency. 
9. What information do you think would best benefit facilities in helping them understand options 
available to them regarding emergency power options/mutual aid?  
a. For example, mutual aid agreements, backup generators, solar power microgrids, or 
battery/energy storage.  
We are also creating a map to display details about facility vulnerability and emergency power capacities. 
We have attached the map we are working on in the email sent.   
10.  Would this type of visual map be useful to you or facility managers?  
a. Is the information on the current map something that can be used incase of an emergency 
situation?  
11.  What other information is necessary to be displayed in the map?  
a. During an emergency situation what information is most valuable to you regarding these 
facilities? 
b. Is this information readily available to you 
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Appendix C: Pamphlet 
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Appendix D: Map key 
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Appendix E: “Spider web” Self-assessment tool 
 
